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Executive Summary 
 
The purpose of this study is to inform on the current state of knowledge of the 
economics profession of the impacts of state and local taxes on property values.  Our 
goal is also to suggest how to interpret some of the findings of this literature as well as 
to provide some conceptual background to assist in interpreting these findings.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Section I provides a brief introduction to the material along with an outline for 
the study. 
 
II.  The Implications of Interjurisdictional Mobility on Tax Incidence and Impacts 
 
Critical to understanding and interpreting the impacts of taxes on both business 
location and property values is the Tiebout hypothesis.  Section II discusses the Tiebout 
hypothesis.  Tiebout contended that: 
 
o Households (and firms) are mobile among jurisdictions, be they states or 
localities, and will choose where to locate among these jurisdictions based on 
the taxes and public services provided by the jurisdiction, as well as non-
government provided amenities. 
 
o Sorting of households and firms among jurisdictions can lead to both an 
efficient sorting based on preferences for services and taxes, as well as an 
efficient provision of public services by jurisdictional governments. 
 
III. State and Local Fiscal Policies and Property Value 
 
Numerous empirical studies examining the determinants of property values 
indicate that increases in property tax rates, when controlling for the level of public 
service, will reduce residential property values. 
 
• Evidence of the negative relationship between property values and tax rates 
suggests that households are influenced by property tax rates when making 
decisions about where to reside. This is one of the central tenets of the Tiebout 
Hypothesis. 
 
o The magnitude of the reduction is referred to as the capitalization rate, a 
100% capitalization rate would mean that a 10% increase in the property 
tax rate would reduce property values by 10%;  a 50% capitalization rate 
means a reduction of 5% in property values for the same tax increase. 
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o Studies of the capitalization of property taxes are distinguished by studies 
examining inter-jurisdictional differences in taxes and property tax rates 
and studies considering intra-jurisdictional differences generally due to 
differences between assessed and market value.  The evidence from the 
most reliable estimates using data on individual properties and market 
values suggests capitalization rates between 60% and 90%. 
 
• In addition to taxes affecting property values, public services, particularly 
primary and secondary education, affect property values. 
 
o Studies of the impact of education on property values suggest that not 
only does educational spending positively affect property values, but so 
do measures of achievement (test scores or graduation rate) as well as 
inputs in production (student/teacher) ratio for the school or district. 
 
o Economic theory suggests that the efficient level of public services is the 
level that provides the highest property value when both the positive 
impact of educational spending and the negative impact of the taxes used 
to finance it are considered.  Numerous studies indicate that the claim that 
educational spending is at an efficient level, that is, the level that 
maximizes property values can not be rejected. 
 
IV. Taxes and Property Values: How and Why does it Matter? 
 
 While not a direct measure of economic well-being, examining the impacts of 
balanced-budget changes in tax policies (both tax and public services) on 
employment might offer some insights into the desirability of the current level of 
taxes (and public services) as well as the current mix of taxes. 
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I. Introduction 
I.A The Focus of the Study 
 It is the purpose of this study to review and evaluate an extensive literature 
within the field of economics that examines the impacts of state and local fiscal policies, 
particularly those labeled “economic development” policies.  Within this extensive and 
diverse literature on state and local fiscal policies, in this report we identify and discuss  
a strand of the literature that focuses on how fiscal policies, in this case primarily, 
though not exclusively, property taxation, affect housing markets, or, more specifically, 
property values.  
In our companion piece, Hoyt and Garen (2006), we discuss two related branches 
of the literatures on state and local fiscal policies.  One branch focuses on the impacts of 
state and local fiscal policies, primarily but not exclusively taxes, on economic 
development, usually measured in terms of employment.  The other branch considers 
the “global” impacts of local and state tax and expenditure policies – how the policies 
chosen by one state or locality will affect the economic conditions and fiscal policies of 
its neighboring or “competing” jurisdictions. 
 The purpose of this study is not to provide an exhaustive discussion of the 
multitude of studies on this topic but instead to attempt the more challenging task of 
evaluating which studies are most relevant and discerning conclusions and inferences 
from often contradictory studies in a literature economists have been contributing to for 
over forty years.  Our primary interest is what the findings of these studies suggest 
regarding the impacts of state and local fiscal policies on real estate markets. 
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I.A.1 Taxes and Property Value 
 Since a seminal study by Wallace Oates published in the Journal of Political 
Economy in 1969, a multitude of studies have examined the relationship between 
primarily local, rather than state, fiscal policies and property values.  Not surprisingly, 
the fiscal policy of most interest has generally been the property tax.  However, 
numerous other studies have focused on the impacts of government expenditures 
rather than taxes on property values.  The majority of these studies have considered 
how primary and secondary educational expenditures or quality of education, by a 
variety of measures, have affected property values.  Other studies, fewer in number, 
consider how government policies or services, such as police and safety or parks and 
recreation, affect property values. 
 We attempt to offer some insights into what this voluminous and diverse 
literature offers in regard to the impact of local government taxes and policies on 
property values.  In addition to discussing the results of studies that offer evidence of 
the impact of local policies from the analysis of data on property values and local 
policies, we also discuss in a very general and non-technical way some of the more 
theoretical literature that provides a motivation for the extensive empirical research on 
this topic.  Specifically, we discuss and explain how evidence on taxes and other local 
government policies affect property values and can be interpreted as evidence that:  1) 
households (and firms) are mobile among local governments and their location 
decisions are influenced by government policies;  and 2) that local government 
tax/service policies are or are not efficiently provided. 
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I.B Background and Underlying Economic Theory 
 Before our discussion of studies examining the impacts of fiscal policies on 
property values we provide a very brief discussion of the “Tiebout” hypothesis (Tiebout 
(1956)), a theory of state and local governments that is central to both the understanding 
of some of the methodology employed in these studies as well as the implications of 
some of their findings. 
I.C State and Local Tax Policies in Practice 
 While the focus of this report is on the findings of previous studies examining 
the impacts of state and local fiscal policies on property values rather than providing 
new evidence on this topic, in order to give some context of the potential importance 
and implications of these studies some summary measures and descriptions of both 
current and past state and local tax practices are included.  
II. The Implications of Interjurisdictional Mobility on Tax Incidence and Impacts 
 As briefly discussed in Hoyt and Garen (2006), in the traditional framework for 
tax analysis, the determinants of the incidence of the tax, that is, whether consumers or 
produces pay the tax depends on the relative elasticity of the demand and supply 
curves for the tax product.  What the traditional framework does not address but is 
important for analysis of state and local taxes is the possibility of tax avoidance through 
mobility.  While high federal taxes could conceivably and may possibly lead to emigra-
tion for some, it is certainly more costly and less likely to be as important as the possi-
bility of migration from one state to another or from one locality to another within a 
metropolitan area to avoid higher taxes.  For example when considering the impacts of 
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federal income taxation, any elasticity of labor supply is likely to be attributed to 
changes in the labor supply of individual workers or possibly changes in labor force 
participation.  When considering the impacts of state income taxation, the elasticity of 
labor supply is likely to be attributed to migration from one state to another as a result 
of tax changes, rather than changes in individual labor supply, though this may happen 
as well. 
II.A The Tiebout Hypothesis 
 In addition to potentially increasing the responsiveness of labor supply and 
demand, as well as the demand and supply for other outputs to changes in taxes, inter-
jurisdictional mobility may lead to a more efficient mix of taxes and public services as 
suggested by Charles Tiebout in a paper published in 1956 in the Journal of Political 
Economy.  In this seminal paper, Tiebout introduced the notion that states and localities 
could be viewed as competitive “clubs” providing a mix of public services and taxes to 
finance them.  If people and business capital are mobile among states or localities, then, 
Tiebout argued, state and local governments should be able to attract both residents 
and businesses by offering desirable tax/public service bundles.  Tiebout argued that 
this competitive framework could potentially lead to both an efficient mix of public ser-
vices and an efficient sorting of people and businesses among localities and states. 
 Tiebout’s paper is brief (seven pages) and very informal in style.  In the fifty 
years following the publication of this paper, a voluminous literature based on this 
article has arisen to formalize and extend the limited analysis that Tiebout offered.  
While some of this research will be discussed in this report, most of it is only tangential 
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to our interests.  Two central tenets of the Tiebout hypothesis, as generally interpreted, 
are important to understanding both the methodology and findings of the literature we 
review.  These central tenets might be summarized as:  
1)  Households (and firms) are mobile among jurisdictions, be they states or 
localities, and will choose where to locate among these jurisdictions based on the 
taxes and public services provided by the jurisdiction, as well as non-
government provided amenities; 
2) Sorting of households and firms among jurisdictions can lead to both an efficient 
sorting based on preferences for services and taxes, as well as an efficient 
provision of public services by jurisdictional governments. 
II.B Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis 
 Tiebout, and others that followed, argued that locational decisions are influenced 
not only by taxes but also by public service provision.  That both taxes and public ser-
vices should matter in locational decisions of both firms and households suggests that 
any studies that attempt to examine how taxes influence employment and household or 
firm location decisions also need to consider the impact of public services.  This 
requires, then, quantification and data on public service provision. 
 As discussed in more detail in our review of studies on fiscal policy and property 
values, efficient fiscal policies would entail that the incremental benefits to residents 
and firms in a jurisdiction from increases in public expenditures should be exactly offset 
by the incremental cost to them of financing these expenditures with taxes.  That these 
incremental benefits and costs should be equated for fiscal policies to be efficient means 
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that with efficient policies, small balanced-budget changes in expenditure/tax increases 
should have little impact on the movement of firms and residents among states or on 
property values.  Thus, the insignificant, or even positive, impacts found in early 
studies of the impacts of taxes on employment or other measures of economic activity 
might be due to the failure to control for expenditures – what these results may suggest 
is that the increase in taxes, also associated with a balanced-budget increase in public 
services not quantified, is approximately efficient.  Analogously, in the literature on the 
impact of state and local fiscal policies on property values, a finding of no impact of the 
property tax on property values when no measure of public expenditures is included in 
the analysis is viewed as evidence of the efficient provision of public services. 
 If, as the Tiebout hypothesis suggests, changes in employment or other economic 
activity due to changes in state and local taxes are primarily the result of inter-
jurisdictional mobility, the inefficiency or excess burden associated with a state tax is 
not directly related to the change in state output due to that tax as suggested in the pre-
ceding section.  If, in this case, unlike the case with federal taxes, the loss in tax base in 
one jurisdiction, the employment or capital (firms) there, leads to an equal increase in 
the tax base of competing jurisdictions, there is no excess burden from the imposition of 
the state tax or, at a minimum, the excess burden is overstated.  Thus, while the impact 
of increases in state and local taxes on employment or capital within a jurisdiction may 
be of interest, it is inappropriate to equate them directly with excess burden.  Further, as 
we discuss in our review of the literature on tax competition, if state and local 
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governments ignore how their tax decisions positively affect their neighbors’ tax bases, 
as is likely, state and local taxes will be inefficiently set. 
III. State and Local Fiscal Policies and Property Value 
 Since the late 1960’s with the publication of studies by authors such as Wallace 
Oates (1969), there have been numerous studies – far more than we intend to discuss or 
even document --of the determinants of property value with a particular interest in 
what impact state and local fiscal policies have on property values.  While the majority 
of these studies have been empirical, numerous theoretical studies have examined how 
and why state and local fiscal policies, both taxes and expenditures, might affect 
property values. 
 While documenting the impact of fiscal policies, particularly property taxation, 
on property values is the primary objective of many of these studies, for many of these 
studies the impact of the fiscal policies on property values was viewed as evidence 
about broader issues.  While not encompassing the objectives of all studies on property 
values and fiscal policies, we offer six general objectives typically pursued by studies of 
fiscal policy and capitalization: 
1. Empirical studies focused on the extent of capitalization and the distribution of 
incidence between owners and consumers of housing; 
2. Empirical studies that view the existence of capitalization of both taxes and public 
expenditures as evidence in support of “Tiebout” residential mobility; 
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3. Empirical studies that view evidence of public expenditures or measures of the 
quality of public services positively affecting property values as evidence of the 
value of these services to residents. 
4. Empirical studies that examine whether local public expenditures, generally primary 
and secondary education, are efficiently provided by evaluating the impacts of these 
services on property values. 
5. Empirical studies that attempt to obtain demand curves for public expenditures or 
locational expenditures from estimates of their impacts on residential property 
values. 
6. Theoretical studies that provide models and predictions of how fiscal policies might 
affect property values and the distributional impacts of fiscal policies, particularly 
property taxes.  
Many of these objectives are found in single studies;  for example, studies that 
examine the relationship between fiscal policies and property values as evidence of 
“Tiebout” mobility often examine this relationship for evidence of the stronger assertion 
of Tiebout that public goods and services provided by local governments should be 
provided efficiently.  Here our primary interest will be on studies that provide 
empirical evidence on the relationship between property values on fiscal policies, both 
property taxes and public expenditures, with most of the attention being directed 
towards primary and secondary education.  While we briefly discuss some of the 
theoretical literature on capitalization in a very general way, we will provide only 
summaries focused on the empirically testable predictions of these studies.  We do not 
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discuss here the more complex issue of attempting to obtain demand curves for public 
expenditures or amenities based on estimating the relationship between property 
values and public services and locational amenities.  We begin with a brief overview of 
the general empirical methodology. 
III.A Estimating the Relationship between Property Values and State and Local Fiscal Policies 
 We begin our discussion by simply stating, in the form of an equation, the basic 
relationship that has traditionally been estimated, with modifications and extensions, 
since the seminal work of Oates.   The equation may be expressed as 
 ijjjijij AGHPV εβββτββ +++++= 43210  
where PVij is the value of house i in community j;  τj is the property tax rate in 
community j;  Hi are characteristics of the house (square footage, number of rooms, 
bedrooms, bathrooms, lot size, etc.);  Gj includes measures of public service 
expenditures or public service quality (for example, primary and secondary educational 
spending per student; educational test scores);  Aj might refer to locational amenities; 
and εij is the “error” in the equation representing random or determinants of property 
value that cannot be estimated or quantified.  This equation is referred to in the 
literature as a “hedonic” equation.  As we discuss later, this specification of the 
relationship between property values and property taxes is not technically correct and 
should be view as an approximation.  Later we discuss the specification of the equation 
estimated in more recent studies on property tax capitalization. 
 Then the purpose of the statistical analysis is to estimate values for the 
coefficients (β’s) in the equation.  While the specification of the equation suggests using 
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data on individual house values in a number of different jurisdictions (micro-data) 
generally obtained from the multiple listing service (MLS), the property value assessor 
(PVA) or the American Housing Survey (AHS), many studies examine mean or median 
property value in a municipality, data readily obtainable from the Census of Population 
and Housing based on self-reported values.  Generally in the equation estimated, the 
dependent variable is not property value but the natural logarithm of it (LN(PV)).  The 
measure of the tax rate is also transformed to be the natural logarithm of the tax rate.  
There are two reasons for making these transformations.  First, it appears that the 
logarithmic relationship is a better fit to the data and, second, it provides a nice 
interpretation – the coefficient on the natural logarithm of the tax rate provides an 
elasticity measure.  Thus, if we find the coefficient, β1, equal to  -.75, we can interpret 
this as evidence that a 10% increase in the rate of property taxation will reduce property 
values by 7.5%.  This measure, when discussing property taxes, is referred to as the 
“capitalization” rate.   Full capitalization is a coefficient of -1 with “under-
capitalization” a rate between 0 and -1 and “over-capitalization” a rate below -1. 
III.B  The Theory of Tax Capitalization and the Impacts of Local Fiscal Policies on Property 
Values 
 Wallace Oates in his early, seminal paper examining the relationship between the 
median house value, property tax rates, and educational spending per student among 
other variables for northern New Jersey communities in 1960 found evidence that  
higher property taxes had a significant adverse (negative) impact on median house 
value and that  increased educational spending  had a significant positive impact when 
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controlling for the characteristics of the housing stock in the community as well as 
community locational amenities (distance from New York CBD).  He and others 
following him interpreted the signs and significance of these coefficients as evidence in 
support of the “Tiebout” hypothesis.  Why?  From Oates (1969) a summary of the 
decision facing households when choosing a residence,  
In terms of the Tiebout model, we can conceive of a utility-maximizing consumer 
who weighs the benefits stemming from the program of local public services 
against the cost of his tax liability and chooses as a residence that locality which 
provides him with the greatest surplus of benefits over costs (Oates, 1969, p. 959). 
 
Then Oates continues to devise a ‘test’ of whether, in fact, households appear to choose 
their community of residence following this cost-benefit approach, 
Moreover, this suggests a way to determine whether the Tiebout hypothesis of 
consumer location in accordance with preferences for local budgetary programs 
has any relevance to actual behavior.  If consumers, in their choice of locality of 
residence, do consider the available program of public services, we would expect 
to find that, other things being equal (including tax rates), gross rents (actual or 
imputed) and therefore property values, would be higher in a community the 
more attractive its package of public goods.  Individual families, desiring to 
consume higher levels of public output, would presumably tend to bid up pro-
perty values in communities with high-quality programs of public services. 
(Oates, 1969, p. 959). 
 
 In a perfectly competitive private market for goods and services, the supply 
decision of a single firm will not affect the market price – any attempt by a firm in a 
competitive industry, with numerous competitors offering identical or nearly identical 
products to raise the price of its product above that of its competitors will result in the 
loss of all its sales.  Analogously a competitive setting for communities would have 
many communities offering similar mixes and levels of public services with taxes set to 
finance these services.  For these services as well as locational amenities and the 
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characteristics of the property we can think of the price as being the property value 
gross of taxes )1(
r
V τ+  where r is the discount or interest rate making 
r
Vτ  the present 
value of property tax payments.1  Equivalently, the annualized gross rental cost is 
( )VrTR τ+=+  where R is the rent or annualized value and T is simply the tax payment, 
τV.  Although we make think of τ as the statutory property tax rate it is unlikely to be 
the effective tax rate on the property.  The distinction between the statutory and effective 
rate of taxation is due to systematic differences between assessed and market values for 
housing – the effective rate, the rate relevant to this discussion and typically used in 
most studies, is equal to the product of the statutory rate and the ratio of assessed to 
market value, the equalization rate.  
 Then, if households are mobile, as the Tiebout hypothesis assumes, and have a 
large number of alternative communities with similar or, at the extreme, identical 
services among which they can choose, then no community could increase the price of 
its housing without increasing the quality of the amenities or services in the 
community.  This means that any increase in the tax rate without an increase in the 
quality of public services must reduce the (net) value of housing  (V) so that the gross 
value )1(
r
V τ+  remains unchanged.  Then any increase in the present value of tax 
payments should be offset by an equal reduction in the value of the house.  This is 
referred to as full capitalization. 
                                                 
1 This formulation assumes, as we discuss in more detail later, that the housing is an infinitely lived asset 
making the present value of the infinite stream of costs simply annual cost (τV) divided by the discount 
rate.  
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 At the other extreme, if households were immobile among communities or did 
not have alternative communities in which they could reside and the assumptions of the 
Tiebout hypothesis are violated, increases in a community’s tax rate would have no 
effect – there is zero capitalization.  Costly or limited mobility or limited alternative 
communities would lead to incomplete capitalization – increases in the property tax 
would reduce property values keeping gross property values constant. In a series of 
papers, Hoyt (1991, 1992, 1993, 1999) models and considers the implications on 
capitalization when there is a limited number of alternative communities or what he 
refers to as imperfect competition.  Then, in terms of estimating an equation in which 
the natural logarithm of property values (LN(V)) is the dependent variable and the tax 
rate is also measured by LN(τ), full capitalization gives a coefficient of  -1;  no 
capitalization gives a coefficient of 0 and incomplete capitalization gives a coefficient 
ranging from 0 to -1. 
 Oates arguments that the finding of capitalization of property taxes or public 
services as evidence of support of the Tiebout hypothesis have not been universally 
accepted among economists in this field.  The model of communities and land that 
generated capitalization had several attributes critical to obtaining capitalization of 
public services and property taxes.  The first attribute is that political jurisdictions were 
of a fixed land area and the economy was of a limited land area, all of which was 
residential use (in contrast to an agricultural fringe).  The second attribute is that there 
is a single or at least finite number of distinct types of consumers, at least with respect 
to their demands for educational services. 
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 Epple et.al. (1978) provide a formal model that illustrates the conditions under 
which no capitalization can be obtained consistent with the Hamilton (1975, 1976) and 
Edel and Sclar (1974) concept of long run equilibrium in a Tiebout model.  The critical 
assumption of the model by Epple et. al., as well as the others finding no capitalization, 
is simply that there is a perfectly elastic supply of housing, that is, an elastic supply of 
both land and capital for housing.  One interpretation of this is that the housing stock 
can respond quickly to changes in demands for housing and that housing at the fringe 
of a metropolitan area is a very good substitute for housing interior to the metropolitan 
area.  This perfectly elastic supply of housing means that in equilibrium the price of a 
unit of housing, property value, is determined entirely by the costs of land and capital 
and must be independent of any other attributes of the community in which the 
housing is located, including quality of education or the provision of public services.  
Essentially, if any individual or group of individuals did not receive the mix of taxes, 
public services, and price of housing they desired (and satisfied budget constraints) 
they could move or create another community. 
 That all land and therefore, housing, regardless of location, would be valued 
equally is clearly not true.  However, the proper interpretation of Epple et. al. and other 
researchers arguing the “no capitalization” viewpoint is that there should be no 
capitalization due to differences in mixes in public services or, in our case, educational 
quality or expenditures given that services are chosen by majority rule.   
 While empirical studies of capitalization received early criticism from the 
proponents of the “no capitalization” viewpoint, the overwhelming evidence of 
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capitalization of both taxes and measures of both educational inputs and outputs makes 
it hard to dismiss theories that argue for the existence of capitalization.  One way to 
reconcile the two views is that differences in land and housing prices due to factors 
other than the level or quality of public services allows for inefficient public service 
provision in those areas in which there are high property values due to attractive 
amenities or proximity to employment.  Also critical to the view that taxes and public 
services should affect property values would seem to be the need for some communities 
to inefficiently provide these services. 
III.C Empirical Evidence on the Extent and Existence of Property Tax Capitalization 
 Regardless of the theory that generates or does not generate a prediction of 
property tax capitalization, it is an empirical question as to the extent and existence of 
property tax capitalization. 
 While there are numerous differences and distinctions among studies of property 
taxes and property values, we can broadly categorize them based on the type of data 
used in the study and the type of tax capitalization they examine.  Some studies, 
particularly early studies, used aggregated data in which the measure of property value is 
the mean or median house value in a municipality or some other geographical region. 
These data are generally from the Census of Population and Housing though some 
studies have also used data on equalized property values from state revenue cabinets. 
Alternatively, other studies, generally more recent, use micro-data, data on individual 
housing units generally from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), the American Housing 
Survey (AHS), property value assessors (PVA) and sometimes data on individual 
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households (without geographic identifiers) from the Census of Population and 
Housing.  The value of the housing is usually one of three measures:  self-reported 
values (Census of Population and Housing, AHS), assessed values (PVA, equalized 
values) or market sales (MLS, PVA).  Many users of the AHS for studies on the 
determinants of property value will only use data on households who, in addition to 
reporting their valuation of their own home, also report a recent sale;  similarly, while 
the PVA may provide assessed values for all properties, most researchers prefer to use 
PVA data on actual sale values rather than assessed values. 
 In addition to distinctions in studies based on the type of data used, there are dis-
tinctions in the type of capitalization examined.  Some studies examine 
interjurisdictional capitalization of property taxes and public services – relating 
differences in property values among different communities to differences in the 
property taxes, amenities, and public services in these communities.  Almost all studies 
using aggregated data are used to examine interjurisdictional capitalization through 
micro-data, observations on individual houses across a number of communities usually 
within a single metropolitan area can also be used to examine interjurisdictional 
capitalization as well.  It is these studies that are most useful in providing tests of the 
Tiebout hypothesis, specifically the extent to which households do base locational 
decisions on local taxes and public services and whether local public services appear to 
be efficiently provided. 
 Alternatively, other studies examine intrajurisdictional capitalization of property 
taxes, differences in the impacts of property taxes on property values within a single 
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community.  These studies all use micro-data.  While studies on interjurisdictional 
capitalization generally use equalized or effective property tax rates, for studies of 
intrajurisdictional capitalization differences in property tax rates among households 
cannot be due to different statutory rates, but are due to different effective rates of 
property tax.  These differences must be due to differences in the ratio of assessed to 
market value within the community. 
III.D Complications to the Simple Model of Property Tax Capitalization 
 As mentioned, the log-linear specification discussed earlier is only an 
approximation to the theoretical relationship between property values and property tax 
rates.  As discussed earlier, we can think of property value as reflecting the value of 
household characteristics and amenities (h), public services (g), and amenities (a) with 
q(h,g,a) being the rental value of this bundle of characteristics of the house and the 
community in which it is located.  Then, following de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999) 
and Oates (1969), the value of a house is simply 
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The value of the property will depend on its expected life (T), the nominal interest rate, 
and the inflation rate (π).  The real interest rate is r = i – π.  However, this formulation is 
complicated even more by the fact that households that itemize get to deduct property 
tax payments.  Letting t represent the marginal income tax rate if the household 
marginal investment is taxable, the relationship is given by  
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since the household only effectively pays (1-t) of its property taxes with t(τv) being 
deducted.  The interest rate is also adjusted to reflect the after-tax rate of return on an 
alternative investment, i(1-t)-π. Thus, to precisely determine the impact of the property 
tax on property values, de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999), Do and Sirmans (1994), and 
Palmon and Smith (1998) attempt to control for inflation and interest rates as well as 
marginal income tax rates.  
III.E Evidence on Tax Capitalization 
 Yinger et. al. (1988) provides an excellent summary and review of studies 
examining the capitalization of property taxes into property values prior to 1988 from 
which we borrow heavily in our discussion and summary of the findings of this 
literature.  While Yinger et. al. (1988) categorizes studies according to whether they use 
aggregate data or micro-data and examine the level of taxes or use micro-data and 
examine the impact of tax changes, we classify studies according to whether they are 
estimating interjurisdictional capitalization or intrajurisdictional capitalization because, 
as briefly discussed earlier, we believe there are reasons to think the impacts might be 
different.  However, for all practical purposes, this distinction is essentially the same as 
that based on aggregate and micro-data based studies. 
 As just discussed, the rate of capitalization found in a study depends on prior 
assumptions about the discount rate and the horizon (length of time) considered. 
Studies generally use a discount rate of 3% to 8% and a time horizon of forty years to 
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infinite.  Yinger et. al. calculate a capitalization rate for each of the studies they review 
using a discount rate of 3% and an infinite time horizon.  As much as possible our 
discussion will focus on the capitalization rate based on this discount rate and time 
horizon.  To put this capitalization rate in clearer perspective with a 3% discount rate 
and an infinite life, a $1.00 tax differential between two houses (with identical attributes 
otherwise) would lead to a difference in property value of $33.33 if there is full capi-
talization.  A capitalization rate of 50% means that the $1.00 difference in taxes results in 
a $16.67 difference in price. 
III.E.1  Interjurisdictional Tax Capitalization 
 Table III.A.1 summarizes the findings of studies that examine interjurisdictional 
tax capitalization, that is, studies that either have aggregate data on municipalities or 
census tracts or micro-data on more than a single municipality.  As the table suggests, 
the estimated capitalization rate varies dramatically among studies from no 
capitalization to “over-capitalization”, a rate of 127%.  For studies using aggregated 
data, the median capitalization rate is 51% and the average is 53.5%.  Studies using 
micro-data but estimating interjurisdictional tax capitalization find a much lower rate of 
capitalization with estimates ranging from 0 to 31%, a much narrower range with a 
median rate of 26% and an average of 25%.  It should be noted that for many of the 
studies using micro-data the nature of the study requires that the interjurisdictional 
capitalization rate must equal the intrajurisdictional capitalization rate. 
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III.E.2 Intrajurisdictional Tax Capitalization 
 A problem frequently encountered in estimating these hedonic equations is the 
appropriate measure and control of differences in public services among communities. 
Failure to account or accurately measure these differences in public services makes the 
interpretation of the coefficients on the tax rate difficult.  One approach to controlling 
for differences in public services is to only consider examining the relationship between 
property values and tax payments for houses within a single municipality in which 
there are no differences in public services or amenities. 
 Of course these differences in tax payments are of a different nature than 
differences in tax payments across jurisdictions.   Differences in tax payments within a 
jurisdiction are not generally due to differences in tax rates but due to differences in 
how properties are assessed relative to their market value. 
 For micro-data based studies that estimate the same value for both 
interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional capitalization we find the median rate of 
capitalization to be 28.5% and the average to be about 44%.  
 For studies either examining capitalization in a single municipality or calculating 
a separate measure of intrajurisdictional capitalization when they have micro-data on 
houses in more than one jurisdiction, the median estimate for capitalization is 40% and 
the average is 38%.  As seen in Table III.A.2, of the seventeen estimates coming from 
fourteen studies, three estimates are no capitalization with only one estimate exceeding 
80% (Palmon and Smith (1998b).  Estimates in ten of the twenty studies ranged between 
40% and 66%. 
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III.E.3  What can be said about Property Tax Capitalization? 
 The divergence in estimates of property tax capitalization, even when 
standardizing discount rates and the time horizon, makes it difficult to reach any strong 
conclusions about how property taxes affect property values.  Most of the extremely 
low estimates of capitalization were from studies prior to 1980 as were the studies 
finding 100% or more for capitalization rates.  Studies using microdata generally seem 
to have a narrower range of estimates even when estimating interjurisdictional 
capitalization and while there is still a divergence in estimates, this range appears to 
have decreased in the more recent literature.   
 What can be concluded?  While a few studies and researchers may disagree, it 
appears from the majority of the literature that capitalization of property taxes does 
occur but the evidence does not generally suggest full capitalization.  Capitalization 
rates seem to vary among regions and even municipalities, and, as suggested by Edel 
and Sclar (1974), Linneman and Voith (1991), and de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999) 
among houses and characteristics of the homeowners.  Given these caveats, the vast 
majority of estimates seem to indicate capitalization rates for property taxes in the range 
of 40% to 65%.  
III.F Education and Property Values 
 As discussed earlier, in theory the market value of a home should reflect not only 
the characteristics of the home and, as just discussed, property taxes, but also the 
quality of public services and other amenities in the area in which the house is located. 
While in theory this should apply for all public services and amenities valued by 
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residents, in practice the focus of research has been on whether and how primary and 
secondary education influence property values with a lengthy literature developing on 
this topic.  
 Generally the focus of studies relating primary and secondary education to 
property values focuses on two distinct issues: 
1) Is the level of expenditures on primary and secondary education efficient? 
2) What aspects of education are valued by residents: inputs or outputs? 
 Then, consistent with this characterization of the objectives of studies examining 
the capitalization of educational services, we consider two ways of categorizing these 
studies.  First, studies might be categorized by what their purpose is in examining the 
capitalization of educational services into property values.  This method of categoriza-
tion is not altogether unrelated to the second method of categorization, the measure of 
educational services used in the study.  For some studies, the purpose, rather than the 
measure of educational services, is of interest;  for others, primarily more recent studies, 
the focus of the study is often the measure of educational service used. 
III.F.1 Capitalization and the Efficient Provision of Educational Services 
 As discussed earlier, Oates viewed his “test” of the Tiebout hypothesis as a test 
of whether taxes and public services influence location decisions.  However, Oates 
offered an informal test of the stronger conjecture made by Tiebout (1956) that local 
public service provision with mobile residents should lead to efficient provision of these 
services.  Oates did this by considering the impact of a balanced-budget increase in 
educational spending on property values.  By balanced-budget, Oates calculates the 
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impact of raising the effective property tax rate from 2% to 3% on the median house 
value.  He also determines how much additional revenue this will yield for education 
and what impact the additional revenue will have on educational spending per student. 
Then the impact of this increase in educational spending on property value plus the 
impact of the tax increase give the balanced budget increase.  Oates finds that the two 
effects of a property tax increase roughly offset each other given his sample and the 
parameters of his regression model. 
 Jan Brueckner (1979, 1982) also addresses the issue of whether local public 
services, specifically educational services, are efficiently provided or not.  Based on the 
idea that how much a government spends on education and its property tax rate are 
linked by the balanced budget condition, Brueckner (1979) asserts there is no need to 
include the tax rate in the hedonic equation and the empirical test of efficiency is 
whether the coefficient on educational expenditures is equal to zero in a regression in 
which aggregate property value is the dependent variable.  Brueckner (1979) employs 
this framework to determine whether education (and other local public services) were 
efficiently provided using the same data as Oates did in his 1969 article.  Brueckner 
finds that the coefficient on educational spending, while positive, is not significantly 
different from zero.  As Brueckner notes, the coefficient on educational spending could 
be zero because some communities underprovide education while other communities 
overprovide education.  Thus Brueckner argues this result might be interpreted as 
evidence that these communities do not systematically under- or overprovide 
education. 
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 In the past twenty years, a number of studies have adopted Brueckner’s 
framework and methodology.  These include Deller (1990a, 1990b), Taylor (1995), Bates 
and Santerre (2003), and Barrow and Rouse (2003).  These studies generally suggest that 
the level of educational expenditures do not appear to be set systematically too low or 
too high if the objective of the municipality (school district) is to maximize property 
values. 
III.F.2 What Aspects of Education are Capitalized: Inputs or Outputs?  
 In economics a voluminous literature has developed on the relationship between 
inputs in the production of education (student/teacher ratios, teacher education, 
expenditures) and measures of educational “outputs,” typically scores on standardized 
tests, usually of reading or mathematics, given at a state level.  Occasionally, graduation 
rates or earnings have been used as well.  
 While this extensive literature may have stimulated interest in how outputs, 
specifically student scores on standardized tests, influence property values, the first 
study that uses an output measure, Rosen and Fullerton (1977), actually precedes the 
best known literature on the relationship between educational inputs and outputs.  
Rosen and Fullerton argue that it should be the output or performance of the 
educational system that should influence property values, not expenditures, as 
presumably the quality of the school is what consumer/residents value.  In their study, 
Rosen and Fullerton essentially try to follow Oates (1969), replacing educational 
expenditures with one of several test scores (mean reading, math, and an average of the 
two for fourth grade students in the school district) in the hedonic equation.  While 
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Rosen and Fullerton found no relationship between property values and educational 
expenditures in their data when they replaced educational expenditures with either the 
math or reading score or the average of the two, there was a positive and significant 
relationship between property values and educational output.  Based on their estimates, 
being in the highest rather than the lowest decile in reading scores would increase the 
median property value by $20,699 (in 2003 prices)!   
 Following Rosen and Fullerton, a number of studies have included educational 
test scores as explanatory variables with a summary of these studies and their findings 
found in Table III.A.3.  These studies generally use individual housing sales data rather 
than aggregate or median property value in a community.  Since these studies are not 
focused directly on whether education is efficiently provided, that is, whether property 
value in a community is maximized, use of individual housing sales affords more ob-
servations and less aggregation bias.  In all of these studies, test scores were found to 
have a positive and significant impact on property values, sometimes quantitatively 
quite large.  For example, Jud (1985) is one of the few studies using aggregate property 
data and test scores, with the data coming from the 1980 census on towns and cities in 
the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan area.  Jud finds that that the average 
district test score for 3rd grade reading has a positive impact on median owner-occupied 
house value with a 4% increase in district test score associated with a 2% to 3% increase 
in property value.  
 A number of studies have included both measures of educational inputs, usually 
expenditures per pupil and educational output, test scores, as explanatory variables 
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often with the explicit purpose of determining which measure seems to have more of an 
effect on property values.  Downes and Zabel, (2002) examine the relationship between 
property values and schooling expenditures, minority enrollment and reading scores 
for the Chicago metropolitan area from 1987-1991.  They emphasize three results from 
their study.  First, that school-level attributes dominate district level attributes in the 
estimation.  Second, that changes in spending seems to have no impact on changes in 
property values when changes in test scores are included in the regression.  Finally, 
they find the percentage minority, both African-American and Hispanic, has a negative 
impact on property values.  
 A number of studies have examined the impact of the demographic composition 
of schools, specifically the percentage African-American or, less frequently, percentage 
Hispanic, on property values or, in a more dynamic setting, the impact of a change in 
minority composition on property value with this change associated with busing 
(integration) policies.  The earliest study of this nature is Clotfelter (1975) which 
examines how the change in percentage minority in schools from 1960 to 1970 in 
Atlanta affected the median property value of predominately white census tracts asso-
ciated with those schools.  He found a negative and significant impact attributing a de-
crease in median house value of anywhere between 0% to 25% in some of the white 
census tracts.  Gill (1983) examines the impacts of desegregation by comparing the 
capitalization rate from 1975 to 1979 of single family houses in suburbs of Columbus, 
OH where there was no desegregation to the capitalization rate of single family houses 
in the city of Columbus in which a desegregation plan was pursued.  Bogart and 
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Cromwell (2000), while not explicitly measuring the impact of the racial mix of students 
on housing values, do consider the impact of redistricting primarily for the purposes of 
integration on housing values in Shaker Heights, a wealthy suburb of Cleveland, Ohio 
between 1983 and 1994, a period during which time boundaries of the schools were 
changed several times primarily for the purpose of integration.  They find a significant 
negative impact of redistricting on property values, with the impact of this redistricting 
being reduced when the student has access to transportation.  The impact of the percent 
of non-white students, while negative, was not statistically significant in any of the 
hedonic estimates.  
III.F.3  How Does Education Affect Property Values? 
 The variety and ambiguity of educational measures makes it difficult to talk 
about a specific value for a capitalization rate as was done with property taxes. 
However, some conclusions appear to emerge from a review of this literature.  First, 
both educational inputs, generally measured simply as expenditures, and education 
outputs such as scores on standardized tests affect property values with some of these 
effects being quantitatively quite large.  Second, while for specific school districts 
increases or decreases in educational spending might increase property values in the 
district, there does not appear to be strong evidence suggesting that level of spending 
on primary and secondary education could be generally increased or reduced to 
increase property values.  Finally, the composition of students in the school, specifically 
changes in the racial mix due to integration plans have had significant negative impacts 
on property values in areas in which integration has occurred. 
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Table III.A.1 A Summary of Inter-Jurisdictional Tax Capitalization 
Authors Year Unit of Observation Location(s) Time Period Sample Size
Measure of 
Economic 
Activity 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Key Explanatory 
Variables 
Estimated Tax 
Capitalization 
Rate          
(With 3% 
discount rate 
and infinite 
Horizon) 
Assumed discount 
rate and time line 
Summary/Implications 
Regarding Tax Capitalization
Oates 1969 Municipalities  New Jersey 1960 53 
Median 
House 
Value 
Log of effective tax 
rate, Log of school 
expenditures per 
pupil, Log of non-
school 
expenditures per 
capita 
61% 5%, 40 years Full capitalization 
Hienberg & 
Oates 1970 Municipality Boston Area 1960 23 
Median 
House 
Value 
Log of effective tax 
rate, School 
expenditures per 
pupil 
71% 5%, 40 years 100% 
King 1973 House New Haven Area 1967-1969 1892 
House Sales 
Price 
Actual tax payment 
minus predicted 
payment in low-tax 
town given current 
assessment, 
Student test scores, 
Perceived school 
quality from 
questionnaire, 
Perceived quality 
of other services, 
Public provision of 
water, sewage 
disposal, or 
garbage collection 
18% 5%-8%, 40 years 30%-50% 
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Oates 1973 Municipality New Jersey 1960 53 
Median 
House 
Value 
Log of effective tax 
rate, Log of school 
expenditures per 
pupil, Log of non-
school 
expenditures per 
capita 
61% 5%, 40 years Full capitalization 
Pollakowski 1973 Municipality 
New Jersey & 
San Francisco 
Area 
1960 53 & 19 
Median 
House 
Value 
Log of effective tax 
rate, Log of school 
expenditures per 
pupil 
n/a n/a 
Capitalization estimates are 
sensitive to model 
specification. 
Edel & Sclar 1974 Municipality Boston Area  
1930, 1940, 
1950, 1960, 
1970 
In the range 
of 64-78 
depending 
on year 
Median 
House 
Value 
Nominal tax rate 
(all years), 
Effective tax rate 
(1970), School 
expenditures per 
pupil, Highway 
expenditures per 
square mile 
20% (1970) 8%, infinite 
50% in 1970: Capitalization 
dissipates as long-run 
equilibrium is approached 
Gustely 1976 Municipality Syracuse Area 1970 100 
Median 
House 
Value 
Equalized school 
tax rate, Equalized 
non-school tax rate, 
Own-source school 
expenditures per 
pupil, Own-source 
non-school 
expenditures per 
capita   
34% 8%, 40 years ≈ 65% 
McDougal 1976 Census Tract Los Angeles Area 1970 173 
Median 
House 
Value 
Equalized tax rate, 
12th grade test 
score, Crime rate, 
Fire insurance 
index, Recreation 
index 
62% 5%, infinite complete capitalization 
Meadows 1976 Municipality New Jersey 1960, 1970 53 (1960) & 44 (1970) 
Median 
House 
Value 
Equalized tax rate, 
School 
expenditures per 
pupil, non-school 
expenditures per 
capita 
127% (1960), 
44% (1970) n/a 
Capitalization in 1960 and 
1970 
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Noto 1976 House San Mateo Co, CA 1971-1973 17,000 
House Sales 
Price Per 
Square Foot
Nominal tax rate 
interacted with 
percentage change 
in population and 
with percentage of 
units for sale 
31% 11.4%, infinite more than full 
King 1977 Municipality New Jersey 1960 53 
Median 
House 
Value 
Median tax 
payment, Log of 
school 
expenditures per 
pupil, Log of non-
school 
expenditures per 
capita 
36% 5%, 40 years 67% 
Rosen & 
Fullerton 1977 Municipality New Jersey 1960, 1970 53 
Median 
House 
Value 
Log of effective tax 
rate, 4th grade test 
scores 
58% 6%, 40 years 88% 
Chinloy 1978 House London, Ontario 1974 1224 
Owner 
Estimate of 
Market 
Value 
Effective tax rate 
minus rate of 
income tax credit 
0% 5%, 40 years  
Gronberg 1979 Municipality Chicago Area 1970 83 
Median 
House 
Value 
Nominal municipal 
tax rate, Nominal 
school tax rate, 
Municipal 
expenditures per 
capita, School 
expenditures per 
pupil 
0% n/a no capitalization 
Dusansky, et. 
al. 1981 School District 
Suffolk County, 
NY 1970 62 
Median 
House 
Value 
Equalized tax rate, 
School 
expenditures per 
pupil,  
22% 5%, 10-40 years 43%-96%, depending on time horizon 
Gabriel 1981 Municipality San Francisco Area 1978-1979 30 
Change in 
Mean House 
Value 
Change in Mean 
Tax Payment 36% n/a Cap. Ratio = 12 
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Ihlanfeldt 
&Jackson 1982 City St. Louis, MO. 1976 1321 
Owner 
Estimate of 
Market 
Value 
Systematic 
assessment error, 
Random 
assessment error 
66% real rate, 40 years 
Cap. Ratio of 22 for 
systematic assessment errors.  
Larger but insignificant ratio 
for random assessment errors.
Lea 1982 House U.S. 1968 680 
Owner 
Estimate of 
Market 
Value 
Average effective 
tax rate in county, 
Average 
expenditure per 
capita in county 
26% n/a Taxes capitalized to a lesser extent than services 
Rosen 1982 Municipality San Francisco Area 1978-1979 64 
Change in 
Mean House 
Value 
Change in Mean 
Tax Payment 22% n/a Cap Ratio = 7.3 
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Table III.A.2 A Summary of Inter-Jurisdictional Tax Capitalization 
Authors Year Unit of Observation Location(s) 
Time 
Period Sample Size
Measure of 
Economic 
Activity 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Key Explanatory 
Variables 
Estimated Tax Capitalization Rate        
(With 3% discount rate and infinite 
Horizon) 
Summary/Implications 
Regarding Tax Capitalization 
Wicks, et. al. 1976 House Missoula, Montana 1965 64 
Observed Minus 
Predicted Sales 
Price 
Change in tax payment 50% Cap. Ratio = 17 
Smith 1970 House 
San 
Francisco 
Area 
1966-
1968 301 
Observed Minus 
Predicted Sales 
Price 
Change in tax payment, 
Proximity to revaluation 44% 
Cap. Ratio = 14.5.  Tax changes 
from revaluation are anticipated. 
Church  1974 House Martinez, CA 
1967-
1970 957 
Log of House 
Sale Price 
Log of (discount rate plus 
effective tax rate) n/a over capitalization 
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Edelstien 1974 House Philadelphia Area 
1967-
1969 2143 
House Sales 
Price 
Property tax payment per 
bedroom, # dummy 
variables for groups of 
communities 
23% and 47% for 4 and 2 bedroom homes 
respectively 
Cap. Ratio = 7.75 for 4 
bedroom: Cap. Ratio = 15.5 for 
2 bedroom 
Moody 1974 House 
San 
Francisco 
Area 
1963 518 
Deviation of 
Sales Price from 
pre-1963 trend in 
the Jurisdiction 
Dummy variable for 
location in the 
jurisdiction with a transit 
tax increase, Access to 
new transit station 
≈ 60% Cap. Ratio = 18-22 
Wales & Weins 1974 House 
Surrey, 
British 
Columbia 
1970 1828 House Sales Price Effective tax rate n/a no capitalization 
Case 1978 House 
Boston Area 
& Hanford, 
CA 
1971 
and 
1972-
1975 
2195 & 
1014 
House Sales 
Price 
Effective tax rate, Actual 
and predicted assessed 
value, School 
expenditures per pupil, 
Sewer tie in, Paved road  
Interjurisdictional: 26%     
Intrajurisdictional: 50% & zero 
Interjurisdictional cap. Ratio = 
8.8: Intrajurisdictional cap. 
Ratio = 16.6 (insignificant in 
one case) 
 36
Hamilton 1979 House Toronto Area 1961 410 
House Sales 
Price 
Community fiscal surplus 
(expenditures minus tax 
payments), Education 
spending per pupil 
Intrajurisdictional: 50%  
Interjurisdictional: 28% 
Intrajurisdictional cap. Ratio = 
16.8: Interjurisdictional cap. 
Ratio = 9.37 (based on fiscal 
surplus 
Reinhard 1981 Municipality San Mateo Co, CA 
1969-
1970 53 House Value 
Effective tax rate, School 
expenditures per pupil, 
Nonschool expenditures 
per capita 
107% 100% 
Richardson & 
Thalheimer 1981 House 
Fayette Co. 
Lexington, 
KY 
1973-
1974 861 
Log of House 
Value 
Dummy variable for 
location in the city, 
Sanitary sewers 
15% 73% 
Goodman 1983 House New Haven Area 
1967-
1969 1835 
Box-Cox 
Transformation 
of Sales Price 
Effective tax rate, 
Average house price in 
the jurisdiction 
Intrajurisdictional ≈ 65%  
Interjurisdictional ≈ 25% 
Intrajurisdictional: 10-122% 
(based on fiscal surplus) 
Palmon & Smith 1998 House Houston 
1981
501 Log (Sale Price) Municipal Utility District Tax Rates 62%  
Palmon & Smith 1998 House Houston 
1981
501 Log (Sale Price) Municipal Utility District Tax Rates 55% 
 
de Bartolome & 
Rosenthal 1999 House U.S. 
1985/1
989 566 Sale Price Tax Payment 32% to 42%  
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Table III.A.3 Education and Property Values 
Author(s) Year Data Unit of Observation 
Dependent 
Variable 
Measure of Educational 
Services Results      Comments 
Oates, W.E. 1969 
1960 Census, Northern 
New Jersey townships 
and cities 
Township 
Median Value, 
Owner-Occupied 
Dwellings 
Expenditures per pupil 
2SLS gives capitalization of 
educational expenditures; 
balanced budget effect on 
property value of expenditure 
increase is approximately zero.
Seminal piece. Oates 
considers this evidence of 
capitalization (primarily of 
taxes) as evidence of 
"Tiebout" equilibrium. 
Pollakowski, H.O. 1973 
1960 Census, San 
Francisco-Oakland-
San Jose townships 
and cities 
Township 
Median Value, 
Owner-Occupied 
Dwellings 
Expenditures per pupil Weak & unstable capitalization of educational expenditures 
Comment on Oates (1969), 
criticizing instruments (2SLS) 
and specification of public 
services 
Edel, M.;      Sclar, 
E. 1974 
1930-70 Census, 
Boston MSA 
townships 
Township 
Median Value, 
Owner-Occupied 
Dwellings 
Expenditures per pupil 
Capitalization rate for 
expenditures decreases from 
1950 to 1970 as does tax 
capitalization 
Argues that Oates (1969) is 
only short run equilibrium. 
Long run capitalization 
should disappear. 
Grether, D. M.; 
Mieszkowski, P. 1974       
Clotfelter, C.M. 1975 1960-70 Census, Atlanta MSA Census Tract 
ΔMedian Value 
'60-'70, Owner-
Occupied; 
ΔMedian gross 
rent, '60-'70 
Δ% Minority (African-
American) High School 
Enrollment 
 Δ% Minority is negative and 
significant on ΔMedian House 
Values in White Census Tracts; 
Median house values changed 
0% to 25% as a result of 
desegregation plans 
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Rosen, H.S.; 
Fullerton, D.J. 1977 
1960-70 Census, 
Northern New Jersey Township 
Median Value, 
Owner-Occupied 
Dwellings 
Expenditures per pupil, 
Test score (average 4th 
grade, reading and math) 
Expenditures in 1970 perform 
poorly; test scores have positive 
& significant effect 
Follows and replicates Oates 
(1969) argues inputs 
(expenditures) should not be 
used instead of outputs 
(achievement scores).   
Brueckner, J.K. 1979 
Same as Oates (1969), 
53 municipalities in 
Northern New Jersey, 
1960 from Census. 
Municipality 
Median Property 
Value, weighted 
for owner-
occupied and all 
units 
Educational Expenditures 
Negative and significant 
coefficient on Educational 
Expenditures in 2SLS 
Introduces the municipal 
budget constraint to eliminate 
the tax rate. Argues the 
negative sign of coefficient on 
educational expenditures in 
2SLS results suggests that 
efficient result is 
indeterminant given that 
median property value is 
dependent variabl 
Sonstelie, J.C.; 
Portney, P.R. 1980 
San Mateo County, 
CA, 1969-1970 (1453 
obs.) 
Single Family 
Home 
Gross of tax 
House Sale Price
Elementary expenditure 
per pupil; Reading Scores 
(3rd grade) 
Finds positive & significant 
impact of both spending and test 
scores on gross rent. 
Argues that gross value 
addresses the difficulties 
raised by Hamilton (1976) 
and others about long run 
versus short run Tiebout. 
Jud, G.D.;     
Watts, J.M. 1981 Charlotte, NC 1977 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Test Score (3rd reading 
grade average);          
% Minority 
Test score is a significant, 1/2 
grade level increases house value 
675 ($77). Minority not 
significant with test scores 
included. 
Uses hedonic to determine 
prices to estimate a demand 
for school quality. 
Brueckner, J.K. 1982 54 Massachusetts communities, 1976. 
Municipality 
(community) 
Aggregate 
Property Value 
Educational Expenditures 
(less capital outlays) 
Positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficient on 
Education Expenditures 
Again uses the budget 
constraint to eliminate tax 
rate. Argues that coefficient 
on educational expenditures 
not significantly different 
from zero means that efficient 
provision of education cannot 
be rejected for the sample. 
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Gill, H. L. 1983 
MLS for Columbus, 
OH, 1975-1979 (5888 
obs.) 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Impact of desegregation: 
comparing changes in 
capitalization rates for 
suburbs (exempt from 
desegregation) to city 
(subject to it) 
Finds large houses (4 or more 
bedrooms) in suburbs 
appreciated after desegregation 
required in city of Columbus. 
 
Vandell, K.D.; 
Zerbst, R. H. 1984 Dallas, TX, 1971-80 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
% minority in elementary 
school 
Minority enrollment & 
desegregation adversely affect 
house values but small 
elasticities, .05 to .23 
Uses ridge regression to 
reduce difficulties with 
multicollinearity. Examines 
impacts of desegregation over 
time by use of a panel. 
Jud, G.D. 1985 
1980 Census, Los 
Angeles and San 
Francisco Bay  
Township or 
city 
Median Value, 
Owner-Occupied 
Dwellings 
District test score (3rd 
grade reading) & 
%Minority 
Test score is a significant. 4% 
increase in district score 
associated with 2 to 3% increase 
in values. Minority not 
significant with test scores 
included. 
Follows Rosen and Fullerton 
(1977) with test scores in 
Oates (1969) framework. 
Does not use 2SLS but 
addresses endogeneity 
following Ihanfeldt and 
Jackson (1982). 
Deller, S.C. 1990 Illinois, 1982 (96 obs.) County Aggregate Property Value 
Total Educational 
Expenditures 
No evidence of overexpenditure 
on education 
Argues that aggregation of 
jurisdictions to county 
eliminates difficulties with 
overlapping jurisdictions. 
Deller, S.C. 1990 
58 small towns (1,000-
5,000) scattered 
throughout Maine 
(US), 1986 
Community Aggregate Property Value 
Total Educational 
Expenditures 
No evidence of overexpenditure 
on education 
Follows Brueckner (1979, 
1982, 1983) methodlogy. 
Argues that previous studies 
that draw on more than one 
labor market might be 
misspecified. 
Walden, M.L. 1990 Raleigh, NC 1987 Single Family Home House Sale Price
Standardized test score 
(CAT for elementary & 
middle) & SAT for high 
school; %minority 
Capitalization of test scores rate 
is higher (more likely to be 
significant) for high school and 
middle school than elementary 
Argues that lower 
capitalization rate for 
elementary is consistent with 
the more extensive use of 
magnet schools at elementary 
level 
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Taylor, L.L. 1995 1980 Census, Hartford, CT MSA Community 
Aggregate 
Property Value Expenditures per pupil 
No evidence of overexpenditure 
on education 
Follows Brueckner (1979, 
1982, 1983) methodlogy. 
Argues that previous studies 
that draw on more than one 
labor market might be 
misspecified. 
Hayes, K.J.; 
Taylor, L.L. 1996 
Dallas, TX 1987 with 
charactersitics of 
elementary schools 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Expenditures per pupil;  
average math test scores 
for school, absolute and 
"school" effect 
Spending has no impact on 
property values. Tests scores do 
but impact is due to "school" 
effect, controlling for 
demographics of students 
An attempt to distinguish the 
contribution of the school to 
test results rather than simply 
use the raw test score. 
Haurin, D.R.; 
Brasington, D. 1996 
Ohio MSA's  1991 
(9509 obs.) 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Proportion of students 
passing all 4 sections of 
Ohio 9th grade 
proficiency test 
Test measure is a significant. 2 
s.dev. difference in test scores 
raises mean house value by 18%
 
Bogart, W.T.; 
Cromwell, B.A. 1997 
School Districts in 
Cleveland, OH, USA, 
1976-1994 
Owner-
Occupied 
House 
House Sale Price District  
Substantial difference in 
property values among 
neighboring school districts 
Follows Oxaca (1973) 
methodology. Decomposes 
the difference in property 
values into explained 
(housing characteristics) and 
unexplained (school district) 
for houses. 
Goodman, A.C; 
Thibodeau, T.G. 1998 
Dallas, TX (US), 
1995:1-1997:1 merged 
with data on 
elementary school 
zone 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price Elementary school zone 
Technique for determining 
submarkets. Submarkets are 
defined by groups of elementary 
school zones. Here there are 
submarkets within a district.  
A contrast to the maintained 
assumption in hedonic 
literature of a single 
continuous hedonic function. 
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Brasington, D.M. 1999 Ohio MSA's  1991 (9509 obs.) 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Value-added: Δ% of 
proficient students 
between grades; Level: % 
of proficient students; 
Inputs: expenditures, 
student/teacher ratio, 
teacher salary & 
experience 
Value-added measures not 
significant in hedonic; some of 
the levels of test scores and 
expenditures per pupil and 
teacher salary are significant and 
positive. 
 
Bogart, W.T.; 
Cromwell, B.A. 2000 
Shaker Heights, OH 
(US), 1983-1994 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Elementary only. Busing 
(available or not); 
%Nonwhite; Change in 
Schooling (neighborhood 
or not); 3rd grade test 
scores 
Disrupting neighborhood school 
(busing to non-neighborhood) 
reduces house values by 9.9%. 
Adding transportation option 
(busing) adds 2.6% if to same 
school.  Racial composition has 
insignificant impact. 
Difference-in-Difference 
estimation before and after 
redistricting school catchment 
areas. Uses Oaxaca 
decomposition for before and 
after redistricting to 
decompose impact of district 
change. 
Brasington, D.M. 2000   House Sale Price    
Weimer, D. L.; 
Wolkoff, M.J. 2001 
Monroe County 
(Rochester, NY) 1997 
Single Family 
Home 
Single-family 
House Sale Price
Exam scores for 
elementary schools 
(English Language Arts); 
For high school: % 
reduced price lunch; 
graduation rate, 
suspension rate, advance 
placement rate 
Positive impact of exam scores 
on property values even 
controlling for school 
demographics. Small increases 
in scores (1%) can lead to 
significant increases in property 
values (0.6 to 4.7%) 
Uses the median value of 
homes in Census tract (or 
block) to control for 
neighborhood effects with IV 
estimation to address 
simultaneity issues. 
 42
Brunner, et. al. 2001 
Voting results on 
voucher initiative in 
Los Angeles County, 
1993. 
Precinct 
Percent voting in 
favor of the 
initiative 
Education "premium" 
capitalized into housing 
Significant negative coefficient 
on relationship between housing 
price premiums and voting 
returns 
Argues that school district 
quality was a significant 
determinant of defeat of 
voucher proposition (174) in 
California. Consistent with 
expected reduction in 
property value in good 
districts as a result of a 
voucher. 
Downes, T.A.; 
Zabe, J.E. 2002 
American Housing 
Survey, Chicago, 
1987-1991 merged 
with Illinois School-
Report Cards 
Single Family 
Home 
Owner-estimated 
House value 
Per-pupil district-level 
expenditures; %African 
American in 
school/district; %Hispanic 
in school/district; Reading 
scores 
School-level attributes dominate 
district level for estimation. 
Spending has no effect on 
property value when test scores 
(8th grade reading) included. 
Negative impact of minorities on 
house values. 
Uses 1st difference approach 
between 1987 and 1991 with 
dependent variable being 
difference in homeowner's 
perceived values. Instruments 
for district fiscal variables 
(tax rate and expenditures). 
Barrow, L.; 
Rouse, C.E. 2003 
Census of 
Governments, 1977, 
1987 
Independent 
School 
Districts 
Aggregate 
Property Value State Aid 
IV/First Difference Results: 
Increases in State Aid increase 
Property Value 
Follows Brueckner (1979, 
1982, 1983) methodology of 
eliminating property tax 
through balanced budget 
condition 
Bates, L.J.; 
Santerre, R.E. 2003 
Connecticut 
communities,1994-95 Community 
Aggregate 
Property Value 
Total Educational 
Expenditures 
Positive and significant 
coefficient on educational 
expenditures -- 10% increase in 
expenditures increases property 
values by 4.3%. 
Follows Brueckner (1979, 
1982, 1983) methodology. 
Focus is on minimum 
expenditure floors, arguing 
evidence does not suggest that 
in Conneticutt these have lead 
to overspending on education. 
Gibbons, S.; 
Machin, S. 2003 
UK, Government Land 
Registry; primary 
school performance 
from Department of 
Education and 
Employment, 1996-99 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Primary School 
Performance (Key Stage 
2, Level 4), proportion of 
children reaching target 
level at age 11. 
Positive coefficient on 
performance measure -- 10% 
increase in performance leads to 
6.9% increase in house prices. 
Employs spatial econometric 
techniques to address the 
weaker link between 
residential location and school 
attendance in UK (than in US) 
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Brasington, D.M. 2003 Ohio MSA's  1991 (9509 obs.) 
Single Family 
Home House Sale Price
Proportion of students 
passing all 4 sections of 
Ohio 9th grade 
proficiency test 
Estimates separate hedonics for 
6 Ohio MSA's. Finds that 
proficiency measure has positive 
impact on house values -- 1% 
point increase in score raises 
value by $708. Estimates a 
supply elasticity of .14. 
Calculates an implicit price 
for educational quality (test 
score) from a hedonic. Then 
in a 2SLS estimate uses 
implicit price to estimate a 
supply equation for 
educational quality -- how 
much area residents will 
increase quality with an 
increase in price  
441i 
IV. Taxes and Property Values: How and Why does it Matter? 
 Why should we care about the impacts of taxes and other fiscal policies on 
property values?  The most obvious reason is simply the tremendous wealth and 
investment in real estate.  Changes in fiscal policies can mean significant changes in the 
wealth of property owners and in the prices paid by those who wish to own property. 
While this may be reason enough for understanding the interaction between fiscal 
policies and property values, economists studying impacts of fiscal policies on property 
values tend to focus on what these impacts suggest about the efficiency of the fiscal 
policies.  That the price of an asset, in this case the value of real estate, changes, does 
not, in itself, imply anything about the desirability or efficiency of this price change or 
what may have caused it.  An increase in the value of an asset will lead to a “winner,” 
the owner of the asset and a “loser,” the potential purchaser of the asset and, on net, 
there is no apparent gain to society.  However, as we discussed in Section III,  much of 
the literature reviewed here, most notably Brueckner (1979, 1982) and Sonstelie and 
Portney (1978) argued that if public services were efficiently provided then property 
values would be unaffected by a balanced-budget change. 
 Because property values change for a reason and not just randomly, it is wrong 
to think of these changes as simply a transfer between owner and buyer in a zero-sum 
game with no net gain to society.  Property values increase with balanced-budget 
changes in government services if the benefits of the additional services to the residents 
exceed the additional taxes needed to pay for them;  if the benefits of the additional 
services are less than the taxes needed to pay for them, property values will decrease. 
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 Then how property values are affected by the fiscal policies of states and perhaps 
more often local governments gives us evidence of how effective these policies are and 
how they are valued by the residents who use and pay for these services – a measure of 
efficiency in the provision and production of government services.  Given the vast and 
increasing expenditures on local goods and services such as primary and secondary 
education and police and fire protection as well as the difficulties in directly measuring 
output or quality of these services, evidence from real estate markets on efficiency in 
these “markets” for public goods and services may be very valuable to more than 
simply those involved in real estate markets alone. 
 46
V.  References 
 
 
Bartik, Timothy J. (1994) “Jobs Productivity, and Local Economic Development: What 
Implications does Economic Research have for the Role of Government?” 
National Tax Journal, vol 47:4:847-861. 
 
———.  (1997) “Discussion of Papers on Taxation and Public Services.” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, New England Economic Review, March/April 
 
Barrow, L. and C. Rouse (2003) ‘Using Market Valuation to Assess Public School 
Spending’, Journal of Public Economics. 
 
Bates, L. and R. Santerre (2003), ‘The Impact of a State Mandated Expenditure Floor on 
Aggregate Property Values’, Journal of Urban Economics, 53, 531-540. 
 
Besley, Timothy J. and Anne C. Case (1995) “Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax 
Setting, and Yardstick Competition,” American Economic Review 85:25-45. 
 
Black, Dan A. and William H. Hoyt "Bidding for Firms", American Economic Review 79 
(December 1989): 1249-1256. 
 
Black, S. (1999), ‘Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary 
Education’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 577-599. 
 
Bogart, William and Brian Cromwell (2000), ‘How Much is a Neighbourhood School 
Worth?’, Journal of Urban Economics, 47, 280-305. 
 
________________. (1997), ‘How Much More is a Good School District Worth?’, National 
Tax Journal, 50, 215-232. 
 
Brasington, David. (1999), “Which Measures of School Quality Does the Housing 
Market Value,” Journal of Real Estate Research, 18(3), 395-413. 
 
_______________. (2003). “The Supply of Public School Quality,” Economics of Education 
Review, 22, 367-77. 
 
Brett, Craig and Joris Pinske. (2000) “The Determinants of Municipal Tax Rates in British 
Columbia, Canadian Journal of Economics, 33:695-714. 
 
Brueckner, Jan. (1979), ‘Property Values, Local Public Expenditure, and Economic 
Efficiency, Journal of Public Economics, 11: 223-245. 
 
 47
_____________. (1982), ‘A Test for Allocative Efficiency in the Local Public Sector’, 
Journal of Public Economics, 19:311-331. 
 
Brueckner, Jan. (2000) “Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and 
Evidence,” Southern Economic Journal, 66(1):505-525. 
 
 
_____________. (2005) “Strategic Interactions Among Governments,” in Companion for 
Urban Economics, Daniel McMillen and Richard Arnott, (eds.). 
 
Brueckner, Jan and Luz A. Saavedra. (2001) “Do Local Governments engage in Strategic 
Property-Tax Competition?” National Tax Journal, 54:2, 203-230. 
 
 
Buettner, Thiess. (2001) “Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The 
Choice of the Tax Rate,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 31:215-245. 
 
Chinloy, Peter.  (1978) “Effective Property Taxes and Tax Capitalization,” The Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 11(4):740-750. 
 
Clotfelter, Charles. (1975), “The Effect of School Desegregation on Housing Prices, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 57(4):446-451. 
 
Courant, Paul. (1994) “How Would You Know a Good Tax Policy If You Tripped Over 
One? Hint: Don’t Just Count Jobs.” National Tax Journal,   47:4:863–82. 
 
de Bartolome, Charles A. M. and Stuart S. Rosenthal. (1999) “Property Tax 
Capitalization in a Model with Tax-Deferred Assets, Standard Deductions, and the 
Taxation of Nominal Interest,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(1):85-95. 
 
Deller, S. (1990a), “An Application of a Test for Allocative Efficiency in the Local Public 
Sector,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 20(3):395-406. 
 
Deller, S. (1990b), “Pareto-Efficiency and the Provision of Public Goods within a Rural 
Setting,” Growth and Change, 32(1):30-39. 
 
Do, A. Quang and C.F. Sirmans. (1994) “Residential Property Tax Capitalization: 
Discount Rate Evidence from California,” Economic Inquiry. 
 
Downes, T. and J. Zabel (2002), ‘The Impact of School Characteristics on House Prices: 
Chicago 1987-1991’, Journal of Urban Economics, 52:1-25. 
 
 
 48
Duncan, Harley. (1997) “Discussion of Papers on Taxation and Public Services.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Economic Review, March/April. 
 
Edel, M. and E. Sclar (1974), ‘Taxes, Spending, and Property Values: Supply Adjustment 
in a Tiebout Model, The Journal of Political Economy, 82(5):941-954. 
 
Epple, Dennis, Alan Zelenitz, and M. Visscher (1978), ‘A Search for Testable 
Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis’, The Journal of Political Economy, 86(3):405-
425. 
 
Epple, D., Filimon, R. and T. Romer (1984) “Equilibrium among Local Jurisdictions: 
Toward an Integrated Treatment of Voting and Residential Choice,” Journal-of-
Public-Economics, 24(3), 281-308. 
 
Gill, H. (1983), ‘Changes in City and Suburban House Prices During a Period of 
Expected School Desegregation’, Southern Economic Journal, 50, 169-184. 
 
Goodman, Allen C. (1983) “Capitalization of Property Tax Differentials Within and 
Among Municipalities,” Land Economics, 59(2):211-19. 
 
Gronberg, Timothy J. (1979) “The Interaction of Markets in Housing and Local Public 
Goods: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, Southern Economic Journal, 46:445-59. 
 
Hamilton, Bruce W. (1979) “Capitalization and the Regressivity of the Property Tax: 
Empirical Evidence,” National Tax Journal, 32:169-80. 
 
Haurin, Don . and David Brasington (1996), ‘School Quality and Real House Prices’, 
Journal of Housing Economics, 5:351-368. 
 
Hayes, Kathy and Lori Taylor (1996), “Neighbourhood School Characteristics: What 
Signals Quality to Homebuyers? Economic Review of Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
 
Heinberg, J.D and Wallace E. Oates (1970)  “The Incidence of Differential Property 
Taxes on Urban Housing: A Comment and Some Further Evidence,” National Tax 
Journal, 23:92-98. 
 
Hoyt, William H. (1990) "Local Government Inefficiency and the Tiebout Hypothesis: 
Does Competition among Municipalities Limit Local Government Inefficiency?" 
Southern Economic Journal 57 (October 1990): 481-496. 
 
_______________. forthcoming “Education and Housing,” Chapter in International 
Handbook on the Economics of Education, eds. Jill Johnes and Geriant Johns, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, UK. 
 49
 
Hoyt, William H. (1991a) "Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power." 
Journal of Urban Economics 30 (July 1991): 123-131. 
 
________________. (1991b) "Competitive Jurisdictions, Congestion, and the Henry George 
Theorem: When Should Property be Taxed Instead of Land?" Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 21: 351-370. 
 
______________ (1992). "Market Power of Large Cities and Policy Differences in 
Metropolitan Areas," Regional Science and Urban Economics 22 (November 1992): 
539-558. 
______________. (1993) "Tax Competition, Nash Equilibria, and Residential Mobility," 
Journal of Urban Economics 34: 358-379. 
 
______________ . (1999) “Leviathan, Local Government Expenditures, and 
Capitalization” Regional Science and Urban Economics 29: 155-171. 
 
 
Jud, G. and J. Watts (1981), ‘Schools and House Values’, Land Economics, 57, 459-470. 
 
Jud, G. (1985), “A Further Note on Schools and Housing Values,” AREAU Journal, 13(4), 
452-461. 
 
Keen, Michael and Maurice Marchand (1997) “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of 
Public Spending,” 66:33-53. 
 
King, A. Thomas.  (1977) “Estimating Property Tax Capitalization,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, 85(2):425-431. 
 
Krantz, Diane P., Robert D. Weaver, and Theodore R. Alter. (1982) “Residential 
Property Tax Capitalization: Consistent Estimates using Micro-Level Data, Land 
Economics, 58(4):488-496. 
 
Li, M. and H. Brown, (1980) “Micro-Neighbourhood Externalities and Hedonic House 
Prices,” Land Economics, 56, 125-141. 
 
McDougall, Gerald S.  (1976) “Local Public Goods and Residential Property Values: 
Some Insights and Extensions,” National Tax Journal, 29:436-47. 
 
McGuire, Theresa. (1997) “Discussion of Papers on Taxation and Public Services.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Economic Review, March/April. 
 
 
 50
Meadows, George Richard.  (1976) “Taxes, Spending, and Property Values: A Comment 
and Further Results,” Journal of Political Economy, 84:869-80. 
 
Noto, N.A. (1976) “The Impact of the Local Public Sector on Residential Property 
Values,” National Tax Association Proceedings, 192-200. 
 
Oates, Wallace . (1969), ‘The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on 
Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout 
Hypothesis’, The Journal of Political Economy, 77(6), 957-971. 
 
_____________. (1973), ‘The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on 
Property Values: A Reply and Some Further Results,” The Journal of Political 
Economy, 81:1004-8. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. (1973). Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Oaxaca, R. (1973), “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labour Markets,” 
International Economic Review, 14(3), 693-709. 
 
Palmon, Oded and Barton A. Smith. (1998a) “A New Approach for Identifying the 
Parameters of a Tax Capitalization Model,” Journal of Urban Economics, 44:299-316. 
 
_______________________________. (1998b) “New Evidence on Property Tax 
Capitalization,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(5):1099- 1111. 
 
Parry, Ian W. H. (2003) “How Large are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition?” Journal of 
Urban Economics, 54:39-60. 
 
Pollakowski, Henry. (1973), ‘The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Spending on 
Property Values: A Comment and Further Results’, The Journal of Political Economy, 
81(4):994-1003. 
 
Reinhard, Raymond M. (1981) “Estimating Property Tax Capitalization: A Further 
Comment,” Journal of Political Economy, 89(6):1251-1260. 
 
Richardson, David H. and Richard Thalheimer.  (1981) “Measuring the Extent of 
Property Tax Capitalization for Single Family Residences,” Southern Economic 
Journal, 48:674-89. 
 
Rosen, H. and D. Fullerton (1977), “A Note on Local Tax Rates, Public Benefit Levels, 
and Property Values, The Journal of Political Economy, 85, 433-40. 
 
 51
Rosen, Kenneth T. (1982) “The Impact of Proposition 13 on House Prices in Northern 
California: A Test of the Interjurisdictional Capitalization Hypothesis,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, 90(1):191-200. 
 
Smith, R. Stafford. (1970) “Property Tax Capitalization in San Francisco,” National Tax 
Journal, 23:177-93. 
 
Sonstelie, Jon and Paul Portney (1978) “Property Maximizing Communities and the 
Theory of Local Public Expenditure, Journal of Urban Economics, 5:263-277. 
 
____________________________. (1980), ‘Gross Rents and Market Values: Testing the 
Implications of Tiebout’s Hypothesis’, Journal of Urban Economics 7, 102-118. 
 
Summers, A. and B. Wolfe (1977) “Do Schools Make a Difference?” American Economic 
Review, 67, 639-52. 
 
Taylor, L. (1995), “Allocative Inefficiency and Local Government’, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 37, 201-211. 
 
Tiebout, Charles (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 64:416-24. 
 
Vandell, Kerry and R. Zerbst (1984), “Estimates of the Effect of School Desegregation 
Plans on Housing Values Over Time,” AREUEA Journal 12(2), 109-135. 
 
Weimer, D. and Wolkoff, M. “School Performance and Housing Values: Using Non-
Contiguous Boundaries and Incorporating Boundaries to Identify School Effects,” 
National Tax Journal, 54(2), 231-254. 
 
Wicks, John H., Robert A. Little, and Ralph A. Beck. (1968) “A Note on Capitalization of 
Property Tax Changes,” National Tax Journal, 21:263-65. 
 
 
Wilson, John D.  (1986) “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition,” Journal of Urban 
Economics, 19:296-315. 
 
____________. (1999) “Theories of Tax Competition,” National Tax Journal, 52(2): 269-304. 
 
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski (1986) “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, 
and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics, 
19:356-370. 
 
 
